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Race, Crime, and the Law' surveys a large number of issues at the
intersection of race and the criminal law and is both informative and persuasive
on many points. Because Professor Kennedy is an obviously talented African-
American Harvard Law School professor and because the book is clearly the
product of enormous and thorough research, Race, Crime, and the Law will be
influential. Nevertheless, the book is disappointing. Professor Kennedy is
indignant about the past, ranges from judiciously critical to sanguine about the
present, and expresses outrage (in unwarranted terms, in my view) at the work
of two African-American writers who propose race-conscious solutions to
criminal justice dilemmas. The book comes close to being an apologia for
colorblindness, the doctrinal darling of today's Supreme Court, and contains few
if any painful truths for the typical white reader. Despite the author's impressive
knowledge and abilities, his book is unlikely to challenge common erroneous
presuppositions about race and the criminal law and may even leave the
uninformed reader with the impression that black partisanship is the most
serious racial issue now confronting the criminal justice system. The first time
I read Race, Crime, and the Law, it made me angry.2
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A., University of Minnesota, 1975; J.D.. Yale Law
School, 1979. This Review owes its passion and many of its animating ideas to my clients. Tommic Smith.
executed by the State of Indiana in 1996, and Ronnie Howard. now on death row in South Carolina. I am
grateful to Kathryn Abrams, Mary Louise Fellows, Stephen Garvery. Barbara Holdcn-Smith. Fred Johnson,
Michelle Johnson, and Angelica Matos for their comments.
1. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE., CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997).
2. I did not expect this reaction. It occurred in spite of my prior interactions with Professor Kennedy.
which have always been pleasant and have often been helpful to my own work.
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Upon preparing to review the book, I read it a second time, and during the
course of that second reading came to feel differently-although not to think
differently-about it. This change was brought about by a seemingly unrelated
event. Waiting outside my fifth-grade son's classroom, I saw a display of
poems. From the titles of the poems it was clear that each child had been
asked to choose a color as the subject of his or her poem. Just passing time,
I started reading the poems, all pleasant homages to the chosen colors-until
I reached the only poem entitled "Black," which read as follows:
Black-it's the shadow of the night,
when you don't separate wrong from right.
When you die, the color's black.
Like when your food is short, in lack.
Black is when you taste rotten bread,
It's also the color of the dead.
Black is when there is no light at all;
When you fall, and fall till there's no you at all.
When you are in the color black,
it's like you are trapped in a very tight sack.
Black is a cat, a raven, a crow,
a chandelier when it's lost its glow.
The color black is a mysterious thing;
a bird, a robin when it loses its wing.
I was suddenly sick and sad, the more so because this was written not by
some angry white child from a bigoted family, but by a gentle boy I know-an
Asian-American child with educated parents. I then went back and read the
poems on the color "White," of which there were four, all joyous. Here is one
of these four, also written by an Asian-American boy:
White is a peaceful dove. White is a cloud that
hovers above.
Winter brings snow, and snow brings white.
It is beautiful in a starry white light.
White is a doily and a tablecloth.
A lightbulb and a single star. A baseball, hit afar.




White is cane sugar, bad for your teeth, white is
honey bread, soft and sweet.
The sound of white is chalk squeaking on a coal
blackboard.
White is the color of an airplane that soars.
White is the color of a tissue from a box,
white is a whisker from a fox.
Reading the "White" poems the second time, I lost all pleasure in them,
though I am white. As I stood there, I was both sad and afraid for all the
African Americans I love-my sister, my brother, my daughters, my best
friend, her children, and one of my death row clients. Then sad and afraid for
many more African Americans whom I like, know, and admire. And, finally,
sad and afraid for all those African Americans I do not know, but who are
nevertheless linked to me through those I do. As I walked away, I realized that
I had been angry reading Professor Kennedy's book because it was less painful
than being sad and afraid: sad for the lost opportunity this book represents, and
afraid for the future if a person of Kennedy's ability and position believes in
the mirage of colorblindness.
Already this introduction has deliberately violated, at least in spirit, the
two animating principles of Race, Crime, and the Law. Politically, Professor
Kennedy embraces what he calls "the politics of respectability. '3 This
approach, at least as practiced by Professor Kennedy throughout his book, is
a strategic calculus for the advancement of minority groups that places great
weight on anticipated white majority perceptions. It consequently urges the
distancing of most African Americans from negative stereotypes. It would
seem to counsel against both my written acknowledgement that a death row
client is among the list of African Americans I hold dear, and the expression
of my debt to two death-sentenced clients in my first footnote. Doctrinally,
Professor Kennedy advocates race neutrality, or "responding to persons strictly
on the basis of conduct not color."' Obviously my references to Professor
Kennedy's race, my own race, and the race of the poems' authors suggest that
I think race is sometimes relevant in ascribing meaning to conduct; and, as I
shall later explore, I also think race is sometimes useful in remedying or
preventing wrongful ascriptions of meaning from race.
In its nine substantive chapters, Race, Crime, and the Law covers an
enormous amount of territory; two chapters are devoted to the history of race's
relationship to criminal law, two to jury selection, one to racial appeals that
3. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 21.
4. Id. at 390.
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occur in trials, one to the death penalty, and one to the enforcement of drug
laws. Rather than addressing these subjects seriatim, I have organized this
Review around the two animating principles described above. Part I attempts
to show that Professor Kennedy's politics of respectability not only determines
which "liberal" positions and measures he supports, but also shapes the way
he chooses to write about them. It then proposes an alternative to Professor
Kennedy's politics of respectability. This alternative draws on other, quite
different traditions from minority communities, and counsels against strategic
abandonment of the most stigmatized African Americans.
Part II first summarizes the "radical" remedial and prophylactic measures
Professor Kennedy rejects based upon his doctrinal commitment to race
neutrality. I then focus on one proposal of my own that Professor Kennedy
criticizes, affirmative jury selection, and dispute Professor Kennedy's argument
that race-neutral measures are sufficient safeguards against prejudiced
determinations of guilt. With respect to two other scholars' proposals that
Professor Kennedy deems irresponsible, I briefly note ways in which his
criticism is unfair, given that the prevailing doctrine of race neutrality has
cabined the search for solutions to issues of racial fairness by labeling them
nonissues. I proceed to sketch what I see as the value-and limits-of race
neutrality in the criminal justice system.
Finally, Part III turns to some of the most despised African Americans,
death-sentenced defendants, for some harsh truth about colorblindness. I
recount the blatant racial issues that arose in the trials of two of my clients and
the dismissive treatment those issues have received in the courts. I hope my
reader will conclude that fighting such racisn with race neutrality is like
pouring water on a kitchen fire: It seems like a good idea only if you know
nothing about oil.
I. THE POLITICS OF RESPECTABILITY
In his first paragraph, Professor Kennedy says that he wants to speak to
"contending ideological camps about the race question in criminal law and
clear space for a shared discussion that will uncover common grounds for
action. ' 5 As I explore in Part II, the common ground that he proposes to
uncover is race neutrality, and he identifies four target groups for this
consensus-building discussion: the law-and-order camp, libertarian
conservatives, proponents of a colorblind Constitution, and "those dedicated
specifically to advancing the interests of blacks."'6 It is intuitively obvious, and
Kennedy makes short work of explaining, how he will appeal to the first three
groups. From the law-and-order camp, he asks protection for African-American
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 7.
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as well as white victims, and he seeks understanding that racist public officials
must be made to obey the law lest African Americans resist all cooperation
with law enforcement officials.7 From libertarian conservatives, he asks that
their "intolerance for governmental tyranny" include sensitivity to "racial
misconduct. 8 From the colorblindness camp, he quite modestly asks for
consistent application of colorblind principles in the criminal justice sphere.9
A. Professor Kennedy's Argument for a Politics of Respectability
The more difficult question is why "those dedicated specifically to
advancing the interests of blacks" should be attracted to race neutrality in the
criminal justice sphere. It is not entirely clear whom this camp is intended to
encompass, but Kennedy mentions Jesse Jackson, the NAACP, and the
Congressional Black Caucus.'0 By its literal definition, this group would
certainly include me, and one might assume that it would include Professor
Kennedy himself; but apparently it does not. Although Kennedy "embrace[s]
this camp's admirable labors on behalf of America's paradigmatic social
pariah, the Negro,"" he describes the group as "largely marooned on the left
end of the American political spectrum,"'" and feels the need to defend to his
reader the decision to "allocate considerable space and energy to critical
engagement"' 3 of this camp, a defense that he bases upon its "considerable
influence within African-American communities."' 4 In the introductory
chapter alone he accuses this camp of "all too often mak[ing] formulaic
allegations of racial misconduct without even bothering to grapple with
evidence and arguments that challenge their conclusions,"3 of "intellectual
sloppiness,"' 6 and of being "unduly hostile to officials charged with enforcing
criminal laws, insufficiently attentive to victims and potential victims of crime,
and overly protective of suspects and convicted felons."' 7 It is hard to
imagine with what he will woo a group he has so disparaged.
Perhaps Kennedy does not expect to win over those he would label as
adherents of this camp, but only those in the African-American community
who might otherwise be attracted to their message. In any event, the proffered
carrot turns out to be the politics of respectability. As explained by Professor
Kennedy:
7. See id. at 3-5.
8. Id. at 5-6.
9. See id. at 6-7.
10. See id. at 12.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 12.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 12.
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The principal tenet of the politics of respectability is that, freed of
crippling, invidious racial discriminations, blacks are capable of
meeting the established moral standards of white middle-class
Americans.... One of its strategies is to distance as many blacks as
far as possible from negative stereotypes used to justify racial
discrimination against all Negroes. 18
After noting the historical roots and the excesses of the politics of
respectability in African-American political culture, Kennedy specifically
recommends two of its "core intuitions."' 9 The first is that "the principal
injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to criminal matters is not
overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws," because "blacks...
suffer more from the criminal acts of their racial 'brothers' and 'sisters' than
they do from the racist misconduct of white police officers."2 The second is
that
for a stigmatized racial minority, successful efforts to move upward
in society must be accompanied at every step by a keen attentiveness
to the morality of means, the reputation of the group, and the need to
be extra-careful in order to avoid the derogatory charges lying in wait
in a hostile environment.2'
Within the introduction, Professor Kennedy gives only one example of the
application of these principles:
The politics of respectability, for example, would have cautioned
against the triumphalist celebrations that followed the acquittal of O.J.
Simpson on the grounds, among others, that such displays would
singe the sensibilities of many, particularly whites, who perceived the
facts of the trial differently. Acting based on the notion that blacks
need not be attuned to the way they are perceived by others has
adversely affected the racial reputation of African-Americans,
facilitating indifference to their plight.22
Although in subsequent chapters Kennedy does not explicitly invoke the
politics of respectability as governing the measures he chooses to support or
the manner in which he discusses those measures, a review of his doctrinal and
stylistic choices reveals a breathtakingly systematic adherence to the politics
of respectability as he has defined it. Whether this is accident or brilliantly
subtle execution of his avowed political choice, I cannot be sure, but it is so
pervasive and nuanced that I am inclined to think it brilliance.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. at 18-19.
20. Id. at 19-20.
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 21.
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B. Professor Kennedy's Respectable Book
When I made a list for myself of all the positions that Professor Kennedy
takes in Race, Crime, and the Law, I realized the remarkable degree to which
he has shown himself to be "attuned to the way [African Americans] are
perceived by others. ' 3 I am sure that there are white bigots in this society
who would disagree with some of the positions he has taken, but the most
conservative member of my faculty (who shall remain nameless), not to
mention my Republican in-laws, would not take umbrage at any of them, at
least not as Kennedy has expressed them; the book is not likely to provoke
either soul searching or discomfort from white readers. Simultaneously, the
minimization of discussion of the plight of the black defendant manages to
"distance as many blacks as far as possible from negative stereotypes used to
justify racial discrimination."'24
1. Respectability and the Lessons from History
Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the history of race and criminal justice.
While they competently tell an ugly story, the horrific details of which may be
new to the lay reader, Kennedy locates these horrors firmly in the past.
Chapter 2 begins by declaring that racially selective underprotection is worse
than unequal enforcement "because it has directly and adversely affected more
people than have episodic misjudgments of guilt."' This proposition, which
Kennedy had earlier described as one of the "core intuitions" of a politics of
respectability, is a debatable one, depending on how one categorizes certain
patterns of official action and how one measures harm from various kinds of
official crimes and derelictions of duty.
Lynching provides one example of different ways in which the
underenforcement and unequal enforcement issues may be viewed. Clearly
drawing on the work of Barbara Holden-Smith,26 Kennedy recounts
Congress's repeated failure to pass anti-lynching legislation and argues that this
failure was attributable, not to a concern for federalism, but to racial
animosity.27 Kennedy casts this failure as an underenforcement problem and
a forerunner of the modem phenomenon whereby murder defendants are more
likely to receive the death penalty if the victim was white.s The history of
lynching in this country, however, also may be seen as the most extreme end
23. Id.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
26. See Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the
Progressive Era, 8 YALE L. & FEMINISM 31 (1996).
27. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 56-58.
28. See id. at 74.
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of the unequal enforcement continuum; when black people were accused of
crimes, "enforcement" was immediate, unreliable, barbaric, and without any
legal process. If one looks at lynching in this light, it looks more like the
historical antecedent of the modem phenomena of wrongful conviction and
harsher sentencing of black defendants.
I do not mean to suggest that the history of lynching does not foreshadow
lesser valuation of black victims' lives in capital sentencing decisions, but only
that it foreshadows both underenforcement and unequal enforcement issues.
Historically, underenforcement and "overenforcement" were inextricably linked
in that they both stemmed from intense racial animosity and extreme power
differentials. Thus, to take another example, the separation of the
underenforcement chapter's discussion of the failure to protect slaves from
murder and assault from the unequal enforcement chapter's discussion of the
separate criminal laws and punishments that were applied to slaves seems
artificial. Although they are separate wrongs, both flowed from the powerless
and stigmatized status of African Americans as slaves. Moreover, slave status
itself is easily seen as ubiquitous unequal enforcement; if slaves had not been
property, it would not have been a crime for them to run away.
Creating a sharp distinction between underenforcement and unequal
enforcement and deeming underenforcement the more important evil allows
Professor Kennedy to focus on the black victim and to abandon the black
defendant. Not coincidentally, a focus on the black victim dovetails with the
needs of the politics of respectability. While talking about black victims
suggests that "freed of crippling, invidious racial discriminations, blacks are
capable of meeting the established moral standards of white middle-class
Americans," talking about black defendants does not, and fails therefore to
"distance as many blacks as far as possible from negative stereotypes used to
justify racial discrimination against all Negroes. ' 29 Accordingly, after the
chapters on the history of race and criminal justice, Professor Kennedy ceases
to champion the interests of black defendants and often fails to mention them
at all, even when such a discussion would seem required by the topic. For
example, Kennedy mentions exactly one wrongful post-civil rights era racially
motivated conviction in the text30 and refers to two more in a footnote; 3' even
these are in a chapter on history. Whatever Kennedy's intentions, his omissions
risk leaving many white readers with the comfortable impression that wrongful
conviction of black defendants is almost entirely a thing of the past.32
29. Id. at 17.
30. See id. at 125-27 (describing the 1980 wrongful conviction of Clarence Brandley in Texas).
31. See id. at 127 n.* (describing erroneous convictions reversed in 1996 in Illinois and in 1993 in
Alabama).
32. Kennedy does note that eases like his example "are not simply a part of the past. They are also
part of the present and the future." Id. at 127. His emphasis, however, implies that cases like Bradley's are
a very small part of the present and future.
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2. Respectable Criticisms of Present Law
Two chapters are devoted to criticism of present law, one addressing the
Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp" and one considering the
use of race in detention decisions. Neither chapter considers the black
defendant. Each contains peculiarities, both in what is said and what is not
said, that I suspect can be attributed to the politics of respectability.
The first peculiarity occurs in Kennedy's discussion of McCleskey in his
chapter on the death penalty. In McCleskey, the Supreme Court held that a
statistical showing of racial discrimination in the imposition of capital
punishment in Georgia did not create an inference that race had influenced
Warren McCleskey's sentence, and that, absent individualized proof of racial
discrimination, his death sentence did not violate either the Equal Protection
Clause or the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.3 Kennedy describes
the underlying statistical study designed and carried out by David Baldus, who
investigated more than 2000 Georgia homicides and some 230 variables that
might cause spurious correlations between race and death sentences." That
study, as Kennedy recounts, concluded that the race of the victim strongly and
significantly predicts the incidence of death sentences; indeed, the study
found that the odds of receiving a death sentence were 4.3 times greater for
defendants who killed whites than for defendants who killed African
Americans. 37
What seems strange is that Kennedy goes out of his way to
dismiss-wrongly-McCleskey's second claim: that the administration of the
death penalty discriminated on the basis of race of the defendant as well as
race of the victim, albeit to a lesser extent. Kennedy writes, -[V]iewing the
evidence on a statewide basis, Baldus found 'neither strong nor consistent'
evidence of discrimination directed against black defendants because of their
race." 38 Yet even Justice Powell's majority opinion reports Baldus's finding
that a black defendant, by virtue of his race, faced a ten percent increase in the
likelihood of a death sentence. 39 Baldus does use the language quoted by
Kennedy, but this is only part of the story; Baldus also reports that in Georgia,
as in other jurisdictions, there was some race-of-defendant discrimination in
some counties at some stages of the proceedings. 0 Indeed, in the same
33. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
34. See id. at 313, 319.
35. See David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death
Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STrsO, L. REv. 133 (1986).
36. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 328-30.
37. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
38. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 329 (quoting Baldus ct al.. supra note 35. at 158).
39. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287 ("[B]Iack defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death
sentence as other defendants.").
40. See Baldus et al., supra note 35, at 158.
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paragraph, Baldus suggests an explanation for why some studies may find no
race-of-defendant effects: Discrimination against African-American defendants
in rural areas with predominantly white juries is offset by discrimination in
favor of them in urban areas with predominantly black juries.4 The race-of-
victim and race-of-defendant findings would then seem to be corroborating and
complementary: There is a large group of white people who subconsciously
value black victims less than white victims, and a smaller group of white
people who feel more punitive toward black defendants than toward white
defendants regardless of the race of their victims.42 So why this odd and
misleading characterization of McCleskey and the Baldus study-unless it is
to justify an exclusive focus on the respectable black victim?
The next peculiarity lies in Kennedy's indecision about how the Court
should have decided the case. First, he states that none of the Justices'
opinions in McCleskey is "altogether satisfactory."43 He criticizes Justice
Powell's majority opinion for its "minimization of the facts behind
McCleskey's claim '" and its refusal to acknowledge that certain distinctive
aspects of the case-the irrevocability of death and the "especially toxic
demarcation"4 of race-should mitigate the Court's fear of opening the door
to endless litigation and disruption in the criminal justice system. Then
Kennedy criticizes the dissents for engaging in "sentimentality"46 and explains
the difficulties inherent in their remedies: Brennan and Marshall would remedy
racial discrimination by abolishing the death penalty altogether,47 but that
would entail significant costs for those who support capital punishment;48
Stevens's and Blackmun's remedy, to restrict capital punishment to the
category of "extremely serious crimes," where evidence of race-of-victim
discrimination is weakest,49 is less drastic, but it is still unsatisfactory because
it would preclude imposition of the death penalty for some defendants whom
many would see as deserving death.50
These criticisms seem fair enough; but what does Kennedy propose? He
considers-without ever actually endorsing-the "level-up" solution, that is,
using race-conscious measures to secure more death sentences against the
murderers of black victims.51 Kennedy notes that this would not be race-
41. See id. at 158-61.
42. Preliminary results from Professor Baldus's new study of capital convictions in Philadelphia find
both race-of-victim and race-of-defendant effects. See David C. Baldus, Address at Cornell Law School
"How the Death Penalty Works" Symposium (Mar. 28, 1998). Baldus will publish his findings in an article
in the Cornell Law Review later this year.
43. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 335.
44. Id. at 336.
45. Id. at 337.
46. Id. at 339.
47. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
48. See KENNEDY, supra note I, at 341.
49. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.).
50. See KENNEDY, supra note I, at 341-42.
51. See id. at 344-45.
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neutral, but he speculates that, in this instance, the abandonment of race
neutrality might be seen as
a danger worth risking in order to encourage officials to take more
seriously the security and suffering of black communities and in order
to symbolize the affirmative constitutional obligation to insure some
rough measure of substantive racial equality in every sphere of
American life-including the provision of law enforcement
resources.52
How could Kennedy, with his otherwise steadfast devotion to race
neutrality, seriously contemplate seeking death sentences based on racial
criteria? If ever there were a place for race neutrality, surely this is it. The
McCleskey problem is that death sentences have in fact been tainted by racial
considerations, as Baldus demonstrated. But the remedy for this can hardly be
to taint more death sentences with racial considerations. Moreover, under the
"level-up" solution, most of the defendants who will be subjected to greater
likelihood of death on account of the victim's race will themselves be black,
because the vast majority of black victim homicides are committed by black
defendants. Kennedy does not endorse the "level-up" solution, but neither does
he reject it. How can he find this such a close question? I can only hypothesize
that Kennedy finds the question close because he does not look at the effects
on black defendants, but focuses solely on (respectable) black victims.
Kennedy's treatment of the proposed Racial Justice Act (RJA) is similarly
disconcerting. Under this proposal, which twice passed the House of
Representatives but floundered in the Senate, 3 a defendant sentenced to death
would not have to show the individualized purposeful discrimination that
McCleskey required and found lacking. Instead, a showing of statistical
disparity would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that racial discrimination
had tainted any given death sentence. The government would then have the
burden of showing either that nonracial factors created the apparent disparities
or, alternatively, that the crime involved was so aggravated that the defendant
would have been sentenced to death absent racial disparities.54 Kennedy
criticizes members of Congress who opposed the RJA for failing to
acknowledge "racial distortions in [capital punishment's] administration""-
52. Id. at 345.
53. See id. at 346; see also For the Record, WASH. PosT, June 7. 1990, at V07 (noting the demise
of the 1990 Racial Justice Act); Carl Upchurch. Crime Bill Debacle. BALTIMORE SUN. Aug. 12. 1994, at
21A (lamenting the similar fate of the 1994 Racial Justice Act).
54. See KENNEDY, supra note 1. at 346; see also Vada Berger ct al., Comment. Too Much Justice.
A Legislative Response to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 437. 467 (1989) (noting that
a state would likely be able to rebut a prima facie showing with respect to identifiable subgroups for whuch
there were no significant racial disparities).
55. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 348.
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much the same criticism as the one he levied against Justice Powell's opinion
in McCleskey.
At this point, one might begin to hypothesize that Kennedy postponed a
conclusion on McCleskey in order to set up a distinction between constitutional
and statutory reform. This is not Kennedy's agenda, however, as demonstrated
by his subsequent statement that one could reasonably oppose the RJA based
on a view that the value of capital punishment outweighs the costs of racially
discriminatory administration." Once more, he abjures any conclusion. Why?
Is it possible he has no ultimate opinion on the desirability of the RJA? Or is
it that the politics of respectability cou, els against a strong statement on an
issue that many whites feel very strongly about?
Most peculiar of all is the last section of the capital punishment chapter,
entitled "Race, Parochialism, and the Marketplace of Emotion." 57 Race-of-
victim effects, Professor Kennedy writes, reflect a "race-conscious society
which continually reproduces a racially stratified marketplace of emotion"
stemming from our "tragic history of race relations., 58 Becoming
philosophical, he then notes that the race-of-victim data also reflect the larger
problem that "we all devalue the rest of the world in relation to our own small
circle of loved ones; hence Jean Jacques Rousseau's charge that the
preferences of friendship are 'thefts' against humanity. '59 He concludes the
chapter with the thought that if people would recognize that McCleskey reflects
"a universal dilemma in human relations," they might more candidly
"acknowledge, reflect upon, and change the realities of racial sentiment in
American life." 6 If this is the respectable bottom line on racial disparities in
the administration of capital punishment-no judgment on the constitutional
issue, no judgment on the legislative issue, and a reassurance that racial
discrepancies are probably deeply normal-I for one cannot be wooed by the
politics of respectability; nor can I imagine that I share common ground,
except accidentally, with its adherents.
As it turns out, the other chapter that criticizes current law does describe
a coincidental common ground that I share with Kennedy. In Chapter 4,
Kennedy argues that police should not be permitted to take race into account
in determining when to stop a person on suspicion that he or she has
committed a crime. 6' Fifteen years ago in the pages of this very same law
journal, I argued that consideration of race in any decision to detain a suspect
56. See id.
57. Id. at 349.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 350 & n. 107 ("All the preferences of friendship are thefts committed against the human race
and the fatherland. Men are all our brothers, they should all be our friends." (quoting 4 J.-J. ROUSSEAU,
CORRESPONDENCE GENERALE 82 (TMophile Dufour ed., 1925))).
60. Id.
61. See id. at 151.
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should be subjected to strict scrutiny.62 I concluded that none of the prevalent
uses of racial classifications in detention decisions-including inferences of
general propensity to commit crime from race, drug courier profiles that
contain racial elements, inferences about immigration status based upon race,
and inferences of criminal activity from racial incongruity in a neighborhood-
could meet that standard.63
While Kennedy and I share much common ground here, his emphases and
omissions are determined by the politics of respectability and serve as sharp
reminders of our differences. For example, I found Kennedy's articulation of
the rationale for his position to be particularly disturbing. He gives three
reasons: First, police may overestimate the relevance of race in determining the
likelihood of criminal activity; 64 second, permitting reliance on race would
"nourish powerful feelings of racial grievance," causing people who might
otherwise assist the police to withhold their cooperation;65 and third, such
reliance might promote racial segregation. 66 These reasons are fine, but where
is the right of the person of color not to be disadvantaged based upon a
generalization about his racial group? Certainly this would seem to be a time
to invoke the mandate of race neutrality.
Even more serious-and more surprising-is that nowhere in this chapter
does Professor Kennedy discuss African-American defendants. Although he
articulates a rule for determining whether an arrest is "legally justified, ' 67 he
neglects to mention whether suppression of evidence should follow in cases
where an illegal arrest results in the police obtaining either physical evidence
or statements from the defendant. Kennedy mentions "administrative and legal
penalties" and the possibility of civil suits, 6 ignoring the specter of the guilty
suspect who is improperly detained on the basis of race. Does Kennedy avoid
discussing the guilty black suspect because the politics of respectability
counsels against such a discussion? Or is it that he envisions this rule being
applied only in those civil suits that challenge wrongful detention of innocent
African Americans, leaving the African-American defendant exactly where he
was before this chapter was written? Can we really fix this problem for the
innocent, but not for the guilty?
This chapter also avoids the related questions raised by Tracey Maclin's
insightful consideration of the ways in which race influences the "consent" of
suspects who are approached by the police, 69 even though Kennedy notes that
62. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect. 93 YALE U. 214 (1983).
63. See id. at 246-50.
64. See KENNEDY, supra note I, at 151.
65. Id at 151-52.
66. See id. at 153.
67. Id. at 162.
68. Id.
69. See Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters "--Some PrelimnarY Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243. 272 (1991).
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he "benefited enormously" from Maclin's work.7' The issue would seem to
be a natural outgrowth of Kennedy's discussion of the frequency with which
black men are stopped by the police: If a person knows that members of his
group are frequently stopped without justification, his sense of free choice in
a police encounter is likely to be diminished. To endorse Maclin's position that
race should be a factor in assessing consent, however, would not only depart
from race neutrality, but would almost require a reference to whether the
contraband fruits of "consent" generated by race-based fear should be
suppressed, and thus would require Kennedy to mention guilty black
defendants. So perhaps it is not surprising that this related topic was bypassed;
both race neutrality and the politics of respectability would seem to counsel
against its inclusion.
The two chapters just discussed focus on criticisms of present law, but
there are several other points at which Professor Kennedy mildly chastises the
racial bias of existing law in passing. In each case, as in his criticisms of
capital punishment's administration and of the detention of black suspects, he
ultimately subordinates the interests of the black defendant to the politics of
respectability. For example, in Chapter 8, entitled "Playing the Race Card,"
Kennedy notes the insensitivity of some courts to racially offensive remarks,
but he is sanguine in his conclusion that, with the exception of capital cases,
"judges are typically balancing reasonably the competing values that are in
tension with one another."'" This view is radically different from the
conclusion I reached after reviewing post-civil rights era cases involving
racially inflammatory arguments.72 It does, however, allow Kennedy to
reassure the reader that an automatic reversal rule is unnecessary and that
harmless error doctrine will usually preclude reversals even if more cases of
misconduct are acknowledged. Moreover, far more of this chapter's vehemence
is directed at another, more comfortable target: defense attorneys (and
academics) who attempt to help their African-American clients by playing the
"race card. 7 3
Kennedy's treatment of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Armstrong 4 provides yet another example of mild criticism of existing law
embedded in a larger position that offers no real relief from racism for black
70. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 420 n.2.
71. Id. at 276. Kennedy rejects an automatic reversal rule for cases of racial bias except in the
sentencing stage of capital cases. See id.
72. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739 (1993)
(concluding that egregious uses of race are still common and largely unchecked by reviewing courts, and
proposing legislation that specifically defines racial imagery and provides for automatic reversal when it
is used in a criminal case); see also infra Section III.A (describing the case of Tommie Smith, in which
the prosecutor used racially inflammatory language to depict the defendant to the jury).
73. KENNEDY, supra note I, at 286-310. In that section, as I discuss infra Section 11.C, Kennedy
castigates Professor Paul Butler in harsher terms than any he uses to describe demagogic prosecutors or
indifferent judges.
74. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
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defendants. In Armstrong, the Court reversed a trial court's order for discovery
relating to the defendant's selective prosecution claim, holding that discovery
was unwarranted given the defendant's failure to produce evidence that
similarly situated defendants of other races were not prosecuted.75 Professor
Kennedy disapproves of the Court's reversal of the trial judge's order, but he
does so without endorsing the trial judge's determination; he concludes only
that the decision was within the broad discretion ordinarily allowed trial
judges. 76 Even this half-hearted criticism is almost a procedural aside.
Kennedy hurries on to assure the reader that substantive relief for defendants
claiming racial discrimination in the prosecution of drug offenses should not
and will not be forthcoming.77
Thus, at no step does Kennedy's book offer the African-American
defendant the prospect of significant relief beyond that offered by current law,
and at every step he attempts to draw attention away from African-American
defendants and the race-based harms they suffer. As I believe my examples
demonstrate, this tally is not merely an accidental by-product of his doctrinal
commitment to race neutrality, but the result of scrupulous adherence to the
politics of respectability that he advocates in his introductory chapter. Indeed,
the sole situation in which he does not reject a color-conscious solution
suggests that the politics of respectability might trump the doctrine of race
neutrality when they are played against each other: Race conscious "leveling
up" in capital sentencing subordinates the black defendant's interest in life to
the black victim's interest in revenge.
C. Rejecting Respectability
My own positions on the issues outlined above are drawn largely from
minority group political traditions, albeit ones quite different from those that
foreshadow Kennedy's positions. I therefore sketch my alternative to
Kennedy's politics of respectability, not because my own position should be
particularly credited, but as a reminder that a quite different strategy has
equally authentic roots in minority communities. As Regina Austin so
beautifully demonstrates, the African-American community has, both over time
and across individuals, displayed widely heterogeneous attitudes toward
lawbreakers. 8 Among those stances is the one that animates my own work,
which I shall call "seeing the bottom" politics by amending Mari Matusda's
75. See id. at 1487.
76. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 358.
77. See id. at 359-86.
78. See Regina Austin, "The Black Communit)'" Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770-75 (1992).
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phrase.79 As the reader may guess, "seeing the bottom" politics unequivocally
counsels against burying the black defendant, either literally or figuratively.
I could choose any number of places to begin describing this approach, but
I shall begin with the Gospel according to Saint Matthew. Given the dominant
position of Christians in America, this might seem a strange place to start. It
bears remembering, however, that when this passage was written, Christians
were a despised minority within a despised and powerless people. Moreover,
the influence of Christian teaching on the politics of African Americans has
been enormous, both because prominent leaders such as Martin Luther King,
Jr., and Jesse Jackson have been Christian clergymen and because local black
churches have often been involved in the civil rights struggle at the grass roots
level. It is hard to imagine a statement more contrary to the politics of
respectability than the following:
Then the King will say to those on his right hand, "Come, you
blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the
foundation of the world: for I was hungry and you gave Me food; I
was thirsty and you gave Me drink; I was a stranger and you took Me
in; I was naked and you clothed Me; I was sick and you visited Me;
I was in prison and you came to Me." Then the righteous will answer
Him, saying, "Lord, when did we see You hungry and feed You, or
thirsty and give You drink? When did we see You a stranger and take
You in, or naked and clothe You? Or when did we see You sick, or
in prison, and come to You?" And the King will answer and say to
them, "Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did it to one of the
least of these My brethren, you did it to Me."80
The counsel of this passage clearly calls for a radically inclusionary politics:
The leader identifies himself personally ("I was . . ." ) with the least favored
and the most despised, and he instructs his disciples that their very salvation
depends upon how they treat these hungry, thirsty, naked, sick, unknown
prisoners.
This lesson has not been lost on black churches. In my personal
experience, black Christian churches have been much better than their white
counterparts at "Hate the sin, love the sinner." Nor do I think my personal
experience is idiosyncratic: Historically, black churches have not abandoned
poor pregnant girls, made them wear scarlet letters,8' or burned witches.8 2
They have also, to use another biblical metaphor, rejoiced when the prodigal
79. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987).
80. Matthew 25:34-40.
81. Cf. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Sculley Bradley et al. eds., W.W. Norton
& Co. 1962) (1850).
82. See KAI T. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 137-59
(1966).
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son came home, even when his return was from a prison. Moreover, Black
Muslim churches have had a similar attitude toward the least respectable
members of the black community. Indeed, they have often aggressively
recruited members from among the down and out, offering them both material
assistance and hope. Proselytizing efforts have been particularly vigorous and
successful in prisons;13 this is as true today as it was in Malcolm X's time.
s4
In part, the black community has embraced convicted felons because some
African Americans were convicted for acts that the community did not see as
morally blameworthy. As Kennedy notes, at various times it has been a crime
for African Americans to flee slavery, defend themselves or other African
Americans from physical violence, learn to read, or disobey segregationist
laws.85 Moreover, some of the solicitude for black felons convicted of mal in
se offenses has stemmed from a belief that they were wrongly convicted.
Kennedy appears to identify one prominent member of the African-American
community who did not embrace the guilty defendant when, in support of the
lineage of his politics of respectability, he writes that Thurgood Marshall at
one time refused to represent black defendants he believed to be guilty. 6 But
this is the less probative part of the story, for as resources became less scarce,
Marshall represented any defendant who had been denied a fair trial, regardless
of his guilt or innocence. 7 Moreover, as a Supreme Court Justice, Marshall
tirelessly championed the right of black criminal defendants to a fair trial, and
the right of white criminal defendants as well. The circle of his compassion
grew ever wider, and his steadfast opposition to the death penalty's-even in
cases Kennedy characterizes as "horrible crimes"-makes clear that he would
have had no part in the subordination of black defendants' interests to those
of "respectable" African Americans.
Another source of minority community support for "seeing the bottom"
politics is the narrative tradition, both in legal scholarship and in African-
American culture. Matsuda, Richard Delgado, Patricia Williams, and many
others in both the critical race and critical feminist communities have
advocated listening to the excluded and the degraded for stories that illuminate
the way in which legal doctrine departs from reality.89 The title of Derrick
83. See David Gibson, Chavis Only Latest To Find Refuge as Black Muslim. REC. N.NJ.. Mar. 2,
1997, at I (reporting the estimate that of the 300,000 Muslims in U.S. prisons today. 90% are black, with
35,000 new converts each year); see also Cecile S. Holmes, Ramadan: Heightening Awareness, Hous.
CHRON., Jan. 25, 1997, at I (describing Black Muslim-sponsored programs for ex-convicts).
84. See MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 182-83 (1966).
85. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 76-77.
86. See id. at 20-21.
87. See id. at 21.
88. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 241 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
death penalty is unconstitutional in all its applications).
89. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionusts and Others: A Plea for Narrative. 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Matsuda, supra note 79; Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger:
The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MtA.mi L. REv. 127 (1987).
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Bell's painfully perceptive book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well,9  is another
evocation of the politics of looking to-or at least seeing-the bottom. There
are many more examples of minority community politics that have included
protection of disreputable members, but I will mention only one: Mahatma
Gandhi's inclusion of the untouchables in his moral campaign against British
colonial rule.9'
Undoubtedly I am influenced by my own preferences in deeming these
historical and contemporary examples of "seeing the bottom" politics more
morally defensible than Kennedy's "respectability" politics. But I hope to
convince the reader that "seeing the bottom" politics is also the more practical
approach, given the nature of racial prejudice and discrimination. This is
because "seeing the bottom" reveals the prevalence of race behind the facade
of colorblindness, and therefore the fatuousness of rigid adherence to the race
neutrality doctrine. First, however, I must consider Professor Kennedy's
defense and application of race neutrality doctrine.
II. RACE NEUTRALITY
Just as the politics of respectability appears to determine the modest
reforms Professor Kennedy advocates and the way in which he presents them,
the doctrinal principle of race neutrality both explains and justifies his rejection
of more ambitious proposals. Most notably, Kennedy rejects "imposing
diversity" in jury composition,92 claims of racial discrimination in the
prosecution of pregnant women for exposing their fetuses to harmful drugs,93
claims that the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine
offenses is racially discriminatory,94 and claims that race-conscious jury
nullification by African-American jurors can be justified in some situations.95
I will focus first on the issue of "imposing diversity" on juries, both because
I am most familiar with it (the work Kennedy criticizes here includes my own)
and because the underlying empirical research provides a good vehicle for
discussing the broad assumptions of the race neutrality doctrine. Without
purporting to speak for the other scholars whose work Kennedy criticizes, I
will then briefly note how the facile assumptions and artificial constraints of
race neutrality render Kennedy's harsh criticism of them easily leveled but
inapt.
90. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTrOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992).
91. See MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WMI TRUTH
354-58, 452 (Mahadev Desai trans., Dover Publications, Inc. 1983) (1948) (describing Gandhi's inclusion
of untouchables in his religious community and the Indian Congress's elimination of untouchability).
92. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 231-32.
93. See id. at 359-64.
94. See id. at 364-76.
95. See id. at 295-310.
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A. Jury Composition
Professor Kennedy recounts with approval the Supreme Court's long
history of attempting to eliminate racial discrimination in the selection of the
jury pool, and praises Batson v. Kentucky,96 in which the Supreme Court held
that a prosecutor may not exercise her peremptory challenges based upon racial
generalizations. He acknowledges, however, that African Americans remain
underrepresented in jury venires under present law.97 He also acknowledges
that even if venire underrepresentation were cured and the proportion of
African Americans did not decline between the venire and the jury,
jurisdictions with fifteen percent African-American populations and twelve-
person juries would still have all-white juries in about fourteen percent of
cases.98 Moreover, though he does not discuss this, the proportion will decline
between the venire and the jury, both because of "neutral" challenge-for-cause
rules and because of race-based exercises of the peremptory challenge,
notwithstanding Batson, a matter to which I shall return in Part III.
Kennedy, however, is not concerned about the number of black defendants
facing all-white juries in the same way that he is concerned about race
neutrality.99 He concludes, "We should seek to require not that juries contain
certain numbers of people who are white, brown, yellow, red, or black but
simply that juries contain conscientious people committed to doing all that they
can to bring about that mysterious quality we know as justice."'' The
questions that this statement raises, of course, are (I) whether we can discern
conscientious from indifferent or malevolent juries, and (2) whether
conscientious all-white juries will judge guilt as fairly as integrated juries.
Kennedy can conclude that "a morally good and politically realistic way to
help [overcome racial conflict] is to decline to formalize race-mindedness in
jury selection"' '  only because he focuses on discrimination that
"diminish[es] the number of black jurors,"'' 02 while ignoring discriminatory
ascription of guilt and discriminatory sentencing.
Given his politics of respectability, it is not surprising that Kennedy once
again chooses to focus on discrimination against the most presentable African
American in the picture, in this case the potential juror. Here, however, this
96. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
97. See KENNEDY, supra note I. at 232.
98. See id. at 242. With six-person juries, the proportion of all-white junes would nse.
99. For instance, Kennedy writes:
[Race-dependent jury proposals] should ... be invalidated ... because courts should permit
public racial discrimination only if officials make a clear case that the discrimination in question
is needed on an emergency basis to further a compelling societal interest. Fortunately. no such
case can be made for race-dependent jury selection.
Id. at 255.
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focus has a particular irony and, indeed, inconsistency. Why would
discrimination against black jurors persist? The obvious answer is that racial
discrimination, whether overt, covert, or unconscious, persists in the
decisionmaking of jurors. In general, though of course not in every case, white
jurors will tend to listen less carefully to black witnesses, will be less skeptical
of police officer testimony, and will have a greater predisposition toward
assuming the guilt of a black defendant. Prosecutors, court officials, and
defense attorneys all know this, which is why they attempt to discriminate in
jury selection. Reporters and the person on the street know this as well, which
is why the phrase "by an all-white jury" appears so frequently in high-profile
black defendant news stories-and why Los Angeles erupted after news stories
about the verdict in the Rodney King beating case first aired.
Kennedy might respond that although these discriminating lawyers, court
officials, newspaper reporters, and people on the street all believe race
influences decisionmaking, they are wrong. It would be odd, however, if both
popular opinion and the opinion of those with the most relevant experience-
trial attomeys' 3-coincided on a fallacy. Actually, it would be more than
odd; for if everyone believed that there were racial differences in
decisionmaking despite colorblind decisionmaking, such a belief itself would
be evidence of widespread racial bias in the ascription of meaning to conduct.
Kennedy, calling me "one of legal academia's most outspoken critics of
the all-white jury," criticizes as "overstate[d]" my conclusion that there is
strong evidence that racial bias frequently affects criminal trials, particularly
those in which there are no (or only a few) black jurors. 104 The label honors
me, but I don't think I am at all isolated or extreme in my criticism of all-
white juries, though the remedy I propose may be on the left end of the
political continuum. 5 Not only do the professional and lay opinions
described above comport with my assessment of the problem, but the empirical
evidence that race influences guilt attribution is indeed very strong. Kennedy
does not review that literature at all, but merely alludes to it, wrongly asserting
that I relied principally upon mock jury experiments for my conclusions.1t 6
Although the mock jury studies are the most specific evidence that white jurors
will more often convict black defendants than white defendants, those studies
are persuasive because they are consistent with anecdotal evidence, conviction
103. That this is the overwhelming opinion of trial attorneys cannot reasonably be disputed. The
practice of racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge in criminal cases prior to Batson was
ubiquitous, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103-04 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring), and the practice
after Batson has remained intransigent, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial
Court Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 101, 118-26 (1998).
104. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 242.
105. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985)
(arguing that the Equal Protection Clause requires the inclusion of at least three racially similar jurors).
106. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 242.
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and sentencing data, and the vast body of empirical work that explores the
nature and pervasiveness of racial prejudice.
I will not detail here the findings upon which I then relied, but I will
briefly note the conclusions from the relevant literature on prejudice that I
surveyed. General research on racial prejudice against African Americans
shows a persistence of overwhelmingly negative stereotypes about African
Americans. These stereotypes encompass a wide range of perceived
characteristics, most notably a propensity to commit crime.' °7 They are
conveyed and reinforced by the overreporting of crimes with black perpetrators
as well as by everyday phrases and imagery that associate black with evil,' °8
such as those found in the poem quoted in the introduction to this Review.
When white people were informed that a person was black, they tended to be
inattentive to other traits that the person possessed and were thus less
influenced by those other traits when judging the person.' 9 When white
subjects were supplied with some negative information about a black person,
they judged that person more harshly than an otherwise identically described
white person. Indeed, even white subjects rated "unprejudiced" were twice as
likely to use negative stereotypes in describing an African American pictured
in a stereotypical situation than in describing the same person pictured in a
nonstereotypical situation."0 This suggests that subjects who might not rely
upon stereotypes in judging coworkers would be likely to do so upon seeing
an African American in the stereotyped role of a defendant in a criminal trial.
Moreover, while many white Americans at one time were openly and
aggressively racist, "aversive" manifestations of racism are now more
common."' Aversive racists, who share a desire to avoid associating with
African Americans, often do not express their feelings of prejudice. They may
agree in principle with the general goal of racial equality, but resist specific
changes and believe that African Americans are largely responsible for their
own inferior status. Finally, even persons who are not prejudiced may
cooperate in discrimination against others, either because they fear social
disapproval or because they fail to recognize that discrimination is taking
place. 2
Research on racial prejudice since 1985 both confirms this data"3 and
adds new insights into the nature of "aversive" racists ' and the
107. See Johnson, supra note 105, at 1644-45 and sources cited therein.
108. See id. at 1645-46 and sources cited therein.
109. See id. at 1646 and sources cited therein.
110. See id.
111. Cf. JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 121-22 (1972) (contrasting Northern -aversivc"
racism with Southern "dominative" racism).
112. See Johnson, supra note 105, at 1650.
113. For an easily accessible summary of the primary literature, see T. Alexander Alcmikoff. The
Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L REV. 325 (1992).
114. Jody Armour has argued that these new findings suggest that we should reserve the word
"prejudice" for the more traditional, straightforward form of racism and instead speak of "racial
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subconscious influence of race on white Americans generally. For example, we
now know that stereotypes are so powerful that a person's memory of an event
is often organized around them; moreover, when stereotypes are triggered, a
person gives greater attention to stereotype-consistent information and
discounts information that is inconsistent with the stereotype. 5 One
especially evocative study showed that subconsciously creating images of
African Americans by using words stereotypically associated with African
Americans' 16 increased a subject's likelihood of interpreting another actor's
actions as violent in a subsequent, purportedly unrelated task, even when the
subsequent task made no reference to the race of the actor."7
This evidence, old and new, along with the perceptions of the vast
majority of lay and professional observers, renders specious Kennedy's
statement that "it is simply impossible to say with confidence how frequently
illicit racial concerns presently intrude on jury deliberations."'..8 I am inclined
to think that "illicit racial concern" or stereotyping almost always is part of the
jury deliberation process, though it may seldom be voiced explicitly. Exactly
how often this alters the outcome, no one can say, but the lack of a precise
number hardly means that the number is not significant. The discussion above
strongly suggests that outcomes as well as deliberations are affected, most
often in close cases, but sometimes even in not-so-close ones.'"
9
stereotyping" practiced by persons who do not feel animosity toward people of color. See Jody Armour,
Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733
(1995).
115. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory: Testing
Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 726 (1988); Dale T. Miller &
William Turnbull, Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes, 37 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 233 (1986).
116. The words, such as "basketball" and "watermelon," were not themselves associated with violence,
but referred to other stereotypical traits or associations.
117. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components,
56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 8-12 (1989).
118. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 242.
119. Kennedy argues that because I "hypothesize" that it is in marginal evidence cases that race alters
outcome, and since we do not know how many cases are "marginal," we cannot know how often outcomes
are altered. Id. at 242-43. In fact, I am not hypothesizing so much as reporting the finding of the mock jury
studies, a finding that Kennedy notes is consistent with "the Baldus hypothesis" as well as with James
Fyfe's "hypothesis" that race affects police shootings of suspects in ambiguous circumstances. Id. at 242
(citing James J. Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 707
(1982)). Baldus and Fyfe, however, are also reporting findings, not "hypothesizing." These three findings
are consistent not only with one other, but also with current understandings of how stereotyping---as
opposed to rank racial animosity-operates.
Furthermore, to say that we do not know how many marginal cases there are, and to imply that this
number could be insignificant, misunderstands the concept of marginal cases as I was using it. A case is
marginal as compared to other cases, not to some absolute standard. There will thus always be marginal
cases, and to the extent that criteria for decisionmaking are unclear, there will be more of them. It is hard
to describe most criminal cases as bound by a clear set of rules, for example, or uninfluenced by
amorphous considerations such as witnesses' credibility. Moreover, it is surely true that of the cases that
go to trial, one would expect a high proportion to be "marginal," because it is usually the unpredictability
of a case that leads parties to trial.
2640 [Vol. 107: 2619
Race Neutrality
Kennedy also questions whether "the cost of the reforms in question will
be worth the promised benefits."' 2 He lists as one example of the reforms'
costs the risk that affirmatively selected jurors will perceive themselves and be
perceived by others as representing the defendant's racial group.' But even
jurors who have not been affirmatively selected may be subject to this
perception; indeed, it is a common problem for people of color in
predominantly white environments, regardless of the means by which they
entered them, to be perceived as representing their racial group.'22 This is the
reality of race in America, and it gives little credit to black jurors to expect
that they will change their views in response to the perception that they
represent blacks generally, whatever the source of that perception. Moreover,
an obvious way to minimize both the white juror's impression that the black
juror represents her race and the pressure felt by the black juror to do so is to
require the presence of more than one token black juror. As in other contexts,
the job of an affirmatively selected juror will be much easier and much less
subject to essentialist interpretation if more than one minority race juror is
present. My proposal for a minimum number of racially similar jurors eases
whatever burden would be created by diffusing it; jury dynamics suggest that
at least three minority jurors are necessary (even assuming agreement among
themselves) in order to "hold out" against the pressure of the majority.' 3
Kennedy also lists administrative costs as a factor weighing against
proposed reforms.'24 He criticizes the proposal for a minimum number of
racially similar jurors as unmanageable given the complexities of racial
identity; in the next paragraph, he deems Albert Alschuler's alternative of self-
identified minority persons' 5z as reflecting a simplistic understanding of
racial dynamics.' 26 These are both real concerns, but with regard to racial
fairness in deliberations and outcomes, courts and legislatures simply have not
reached the point of considering such secondary details as the minimization of
administrative burdens. 2 7 Moreover, what is dispositive for Kennedy in the
end is not administrative burdens, but the acknowledgement of race's
120. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 243.
121. See id.
122. In State v. Manning, 495 S.E.2d 191 (S.C. 1997). the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
a black defendant's conviction where the trial court's venue change had been based upon the prosecutor's
argument that a fair trial was impossible because the county was 40% black. Clearly, the prosecutor
believed that African Americans would not convict an African-American defendant.
123. See Johnson, supra note 105, at 1698-700.
124. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 243.
125. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury. 44 DUKE LJ. 704, 710-11 (1995)
(discussing a proposal in which jurors would voluntarily identify themselves as minonucrs on a
questionnaire and at least two of the 23 grand jurors would be self-identified minorities).
126. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 244.
127. Cf. Johnson, supra note 105, at 1696 ("1 am not wedded to any of the details that follow, for they
are not crucial. What is crucial is commitment to some realistic plan for eliminating the effects of racial
bias on the determination of guilt.").
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significance that is inherent in the reform proposals he criticizes. He thus
concludes this section with the statement that,
insofar as the jury quota functions as a sort of insurance policy
against whites' prejudice, it validates the charge that Americans of
different hues cannot hope to entrust themselves to the fair judgments
of one another [and] would therefore likely deepen racial distrust at
the very moment it attempts to establish a hedge against racial
misconduct. 2
But if African Americans cannot in fact entrust themselves to the fair
judgments of others (at least in the criminal sphere) and therefore need such
an insurance policy, why worry about creating an impression of distrust? Only
when we have fixed the fact should we focus on the impression. The lie of
colorblindness is that the fact is already fixed.
B. Racial Disparities in Drug Prosecutions
Professor Dorothy Roberts opposes criminal prosecution of drug-addicted
mothers who give birth to infants who test positive for drugs.'29 One source
of her opposition lies in the racially disparate impact of these prosecutions, an
impact that she claims both stems from and perpetuates black subordination.
Professor Kennedy addresses this equal protection thesis by claiming that
Roberts fails to prove intentional discrimination and does not distinguish
unintentional perpetuation of past oppression from intentional
discrimination. 30 Moreover, he indirectly attacks Roberts herself by asserting
that the possible explanations for commentators' failing to make this distinction
are "sloppiness," ".deliberate obfuscation," or "a tactic of stigmatization
pursuant to which accusers attempt to mold public opinion by making
allegations that sectors of the public are predisposed to believe whether or not
the accusations are true."'t3' All three possibilities are harsh criticism; few
academics would want to face the choice of being labeled lazy, sneaky, or
demagogic. With respect to Roberts, all three charges are inapt.
Kennedy begins by pointing to Roberts's statement that "'poor Black
women ... are the primary targets of prosecutors ... because they are Black
and poor.""' 132 He argues that Roberts ignores the possibility that the
statistical disparities in prosecution rates may be attributable to black women's
preference for cocaine over alcohol and marijuana, coupled with officials'
128. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 245.
129. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. RE'V. 1419 (1991).
130. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 359-62.
131. Id. at 362.
132. Id. at 361 (quoting Roberts, supra note 129, at 1432).
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beliefs that cocaine is more harmful to fetuses. 33 Roberts has not, however,
been either careless or deliberately obfuscatory here. On the contrary, it is her
footnotes that provide the information on drug preferences of different racial
groups that Kennedy cites.' Nor has she been sloppy: She shows that black
women are more than ten times as likely as white women to be turned over to
public health officials despite similar rates of substance abuse, and that
differences in choice of drugs could explain less than half of that
difference.
35
Kennedy then claims that "[a]nother difficulty with Roberts's theory is that
she abandons it herself," and accuses her of playing "bait-and-switch."'
' 3
Evidence for this bait-and-switch, according to Kennedy, lies in two
supposedly contradictory statements: Roberts first asserts that "prosecutors
have either consciously or unconsciously treated black pregnant women
differently than similarly situated white pregnant women,"'137 and then states:
It is unlikely that any of these individual actors intentionally singled
out Black women for punishment based on a conscious devaluation
of their motherhood. The disproportionate impact of prosecutions on
poor Black women does not result from such isolated, individualized
decisions. Rather, it is a result of two centuries of systematic
exclusion of Black women from tangible and intangible benefits
enjoyed by white society.3
The paragraph that Kennedy is quoting continues:
Their exclusion is reflected in Black women's reliance on public
hospitals and public drug treatment centers, in their failure to obtain
adequate prenatal care, in the more frequent reporting of Black drug-
users by health care professionals, and in society's acquiescence in the
government's punitive response to the problem of crack-addicted
babies.13 9
These statements are by no means contradictory. Roberts never accuses the
system's actors of consciously attempting to harm black women. Rather, as the
second part of the passage demonstrates, she believes that the disproportionate
prosecution of black women is the product of several factors, including
unconsciously different responses by health care professionals, economic
disparities, and the perpetuation of past discrimination.
133. See id. at 360-61.
134. See Roberts, supra note 129, at 1435 n.85. cited in KENNEDY. supra note 1. at 360 n.27.
135. See id. at 1434.
136. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 361.
137. Id.
138. Roberts, supra note 129, at 1454, quoted in KENNEDY. supra note I. at 361
139. Id. at 1454-55.
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Indeed, immediately following the passage Kennedy quotes, Roberts argues
that the phenomenon of the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers demonstrates
how far "a view of equality [that] perceives racism as disconnected acts by
individuals who operate outside of the social fabric" departs from reality.
41
In her view, the purposeful discrimination standard is to blame for this
misimpression: An exclusive focus on whether or not an individual actor
possessed an illicit motive allows society to ignore the disparate impact of the
prosecutions and to overlook the different conception of racism that disparate
impact represents.' 4' She thus embraces the antisubordination principle,
which can take account of the myriad "ways in which government policy
perpetuates the inferior status of Black women," as superior to the purposeful
discrimination principle. 42 In short, Kennedy's charge to the contrary,
Roberts has a consistent, unified view of racial bias that is both careful and
scholarly. Moreover, far from employing "stigmatization," as Kennedy further
charges, 43 Roberts's focus on racial subordination allows her to avoid the
divisive name-calling inherent in a purposeful discrimination analysis.
I believe the real source of Kennedy's objection to Roberts's thesis is that
he simply disagrees with her description of the problem and her consequent
doctrinal choice. In other words, we are back to the race neutrality principle.
Should we ignore the race of a person in judging her conduct, trusting that,
absent proof to the contrary, no one else has noticed or responded to her race?
If it is to achieve its purported goal of eliminating racism, the race neutrality
principle must assume that stereotyping is rare and easily identified; it must
assume that our common past as a racist country rarely affects material or
psychological realities.' 44 For if stereotyping and the perpetuation of past
discrimination are not relatively rare and discretely identifiable, how could the
colorblindness advocate imagine that the purposeful discrimination standard
would uncover most discrimination-or that race neutrality would be a
sufficient tool for eradicating disadvantage based upon race? In my view,
140. Id. at 1455.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 362.
144. Professor Kennedy does not state that racial stereotyping is rare or that it rarely affects outcomes,
and he never specifically estima:es the prevalence of prejudice. However, because he deems wrongful
judgments about guilt "episodic," id. at 29, mentions only one modem wrongful conviction in the text, see
id. at 125-27, and emphasizes his doubts about the frequency with which jury composition makes a
difference, see id. at 242, I conclude that he must believe that racial bias affects outcomes only in
exceptional, easily detected cases. In any event, this is the more generous inference. The alternative would
seem to be that he thinks adverse outcomes often occur as a result of stereotyping that falls short of
purposeful discrimination, but that he proposes that the criminal justice system do nothing about it because
of his belief that colorblindness today will eliminate racial bias at some point in the future. Whatever one
might think of this approach in other contexts, such as employment, privileging an uncertain long-term ideal
of colorblindness in a context where the short-term costs are wrongful imprisonment or even death would,
in my view, be morally indefensible. I doubt that Kennedy would advocate such a choice; therefore, I
presume that he should be read as assuming racial bias to be rare and generally detectable, and therefore
amenable to remedy without resort to race-conscious measures.
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Roberts sees racial bias as both more common and more complicated than does
Kennedy, and so she finds both the purposeful discrimination model and race-
neutral remedies inadequate. This difference in perception does not make her
guilty of "sloppiness," deliberate "obfuscation," or "a tactic of stigmatization
pursuant to which the accusers attempt to mold public opinion by making
allegations that sectors of the public are predisposed to believe whether or not
the accusations are true."' 4 5 Moreover, as I explore in Part III, "seeing the
bottom" suggests that her perception, rather than his, is the more accurate one.
C. Jury Nullification
Kennedy criticizes Professor Paul Butler's proposal for selective
nullification by black jurors in nonviolent victimless crime cases'6 even
more harshly. Not only are aspects of Butler's proposal "profoundly
misleading"' 47 and "delusionary," 148 but Butler's sentiments are "morally
repugnant and politically dangerous."'' 49  Interestingly enough, Kennedy
violates his own colorblindness code by identifying Butler as black.'" (At
no point in the text does Kennedy refer to himself as black or use anything but
the third person plural when talking about African Americans, and he never
alludes to the race of other commentators.) Kennedy also expresses fears that
Butler's position "will be deemed by many as the authentically 'black'
position ... leading to the further isolation and stigmatization of Negroes in
the eyes of many Americans."
'151
Kennedy's use of hyperbole in discussing this proposal' 52 would be
humorous were it not so unfair to Butler. 53 I think Kennedy's rhetoric
145. Id. at 362.
146. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System.
105 YALE LJ. 677 (1995).
147. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 299.
148. Id. at 305.
149. Id. at 309.
150. See id. at 298.
151. Id. at 306-07.
152. A particularly remarkable statement is Kennedy's claim that
[Butler's] conception of the irresponsibility of blacks would impose upon African.Amencans
a disability from which they were free even during the era of slavery: the disability of being
perceived as people wholly devoid of moral choice and thus blameless for purposes of
retribution, the same way that infants, the insane, and animals are typically viewed as morally
blameless.
Id. at 304.
153. Particularly unfair is the charge that Butler's sentiments about the OJ. Simpson verdict were
"morally repugnant." Id. at 309. Butler's essay does not imply that he condones murder or rejoices at the
escape of guilty black defendants. Kennedy quotes from one of Butler's editorials in which Butler states
that, after the Simpson verdict, "'I danced my freedom dance along with my sisters and brothers all over
the world."' Id. at 308 (quoting Paul Butler, O.J. Reckoning: Rage for a New Justice. WASH. POST. Oct-
8, 1995, at C1). What Kennedy does not mention is Butler's unambiguous statement from the same
editorial: "We were not applauding the release ofa criminal, but rather that at last the system could work
for an African-American man." Butler, supra. Kennedy also states that Butler's views are likely to "benefit
some violent offenders through racially motivated exertions of black power in the jury box." KENNEDY,
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here is so extreme, however, not out of any animosity toward Professor
Butler, but because Butler so completely rejects both the politics of
respectability and the prescription of race neutrality, the twin undergirdings
of Kennedy's book. I would not myself advocate Butler's proposal. In the
long run, I believe that urging mandatory inclusion of racially similar jurors
because of the greater fairness of juries thus composed is more desirable
than urging black jurors to forsake the law. Similarly, in the long run,
calling for recognition that facially neutral laws (e.g., drug laws) have
disparate and indefensible effects upon African Americans is more desirable
than calling for nullification of all victimless crimes. Nevertheless, in at least
one respect I react more positively to Butler's proposal than I do to
Kennedy's critique: I suspect Butler and I largely agree about the inefficacy
of race neutrality.
Among Kennedy's criticisms of Butler is that his proposal may entail
devastating consequences. Perhaps non-unanimous jury verdicts will be
instituted; perhaps "limiting the rights of blacks to sit on juries might be part
of a reaction to his scheme."' But a legitimate verdict that whites did not
like or see the same way-the O.J. Simpson verdict'15-has already led to
non-unanimous jury proposals, 156 and African Americans are already sharply
limited in their right to be judged by same-race jurors. If we were concerned
less about race neutrality than about racial justice, we might do something
about the harsh situations in which black defendants find themselves. Yet
Kennedy rejects analyses that find gross disparities in sentencing between
crack and powder cocaine to be unconstitutional, based upon an absence of
proof of purposeful, conscious discrimination. Ironically, it is race neutrality
itself, with its inability to rectify the bias faced by black defendants, that
makes proposals like Butler's attractive. Butler's is the voice of
desperation, 157 but instead of addressing or even acknowledging the sources
of that desperation, Kennedy castigates the desperate.
supra note I, at 308. Butler's proposal, however, simply does not apply to murder and other violent crimes.
See Butler, supra note 146, at 723.
154. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 303. Kennedy also raises the specter of white retaliation through the
cutting of social programs, though he cautions that "[w]hether [such prophecies] will be bome out is
unclear." Id. at 302.
155. Certainly, perceptions of the verdict vary widely. Based on the evidence before the jury, however,
I categorize the verdict as a legitimate one. See Christo Lassiter, The O.J. Simpson Verdict: A Lesson in
Black and White, I MICH. J. RACE & L. 69 (1996) (exploring the media's role in the mispereptions of
many whites about the case, and defending the verdict).
156. See Harriet Chiang, Jury Overhaul Urged-Plan Would Permit IIto-1 Verdicts, S.F. CHRON.,
May 1, 1996, at AI; Mark Katches, Simpson-Inspired Judicial Reforms Wilt in Legislature, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, May 6, 1996, at NI.
157. Cf. Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. REV. 143, 156
(1996) ("[N]ullification is not so much an agent of disorder as a partial cure. The complete cure would be




D. Moderating Race Neutrality
Race neutrality is not a bad thing in and of itself. Most of the time, in fact,
it is a good thing. For example, as everyone seems to agree, there is no
substitute for race neutrality in the decision to prosecute.'5 ' Like Kennedy,
but unlike many courts, I also think race neutrality is constitutionally
commanded in arrest decisions. Moreover, in my prior work, I have critiqued
the many injustices that result from a lack of serious enforcement of a
purported commitment to race neutrality; in particular, it is outrageous that
Batson's preclusion of a prosecutor's race-based exercises of the peremptory
challenge requires nothing more than a formal gesture in many
jurisdictions, 59 and that ostensible prohibitions against racially inflammatory
arguments are largely unenforcedt r °
The question, however, is not whether race neutrality is a good thing or
a bad thing, but rather whether it is the only thing. We can ask this question
about either goals or means. Is the sole purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
the prevention of governmental action based on race? It is beyond the scope
of this Review to attempt to persuade the reader that the Equal Protection
Clause promises more than formal equality. I will say here only that I think an
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that focuses narrowly on formal
equality is neither rooted in history nor sufficient for the racial issues that
beset us today.16 ' As Alan Freeman pointed out twenty years ago, "Black
Americans can be without jobs, have their children in all-black, poorly funded
schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have very little political
power, without any violation [of the antidiscrimination norm].'" 62 Although
I would not want to be wedded to any single purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause, if I had to choose, I would opt, with Roberts, for the antisubordination
principle and not for formal equality.
The question I want to answer here is narrower: What purpose should the
Equal Protection Clause serve in the criminal justice sphere? It seems to me
there is a simple answer: At the least, it must ensure racially just outcomes and
avoid proceedings that degrade on the basis of race. 6
3
158. There is heated disagreement, however, over what consutures sufficient proof of race-based
decisionmaking to justify reversal, see McCleskey v. Kemp. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). or even a discovery
order, see United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
159. See Johnson, supra note 103; Sheri Lynn Johnson. The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race)
of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993); see also infra Section II.B.
160. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 1794-97; see also infra Section 11I.A.
161. For writings that outline these issues, see Alan Freeman. Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine. 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049
(1978); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1978); and Roberts, supra note 129.
162. Freeman, supra note 161, at 1050.
163. Often racial degradation of the defendant and racially biased outcomes coincide. The occurrence
of either on its own, however, would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Regardless of whether racially
biased determinations of guilt or sentence are consciously intended, they must be set aside; regardless of
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The remaining issue is whether race neutrality best serves these goals. I
hope the day will come when government can promote racial justice and
protect the dignity of African Americans in the criminal process by practicing
a pure race neutrality, but I do not expect to live to see it. I am convinced that
dogged insistence on colorblindness often obscures unjust outcomes and
degrading proceedings, thus impeding the pursuit of racial justice and human
dignity. These convictions about the inefficacy of race neutrality stem from
three sources: social science research on the nature, prevalence, and expression
of racial bias; the ubiquity of color consciousness in the experience of the
African Americans I know; and lessons from the stories of death-sentenced
inmates, to which I now turn.
DI. TRUTH
I fear that the politics of respectability looks to remedy inequality only
when whites recognize a victim. The purposeful discrimination standard
cooperates, hiding the true number and identity of victims of race
discrimination by claiming that there can be no victim without a malevolent
perpetrator. When we accordingly see very few victims, it is easier to believe
that race neutrality is a sufficient remedy.
This is the wrong approach; the way to see the right one is by starting at
the bottom. This is what Roberts does when she asks us to look at black
women prosecuted for giving birth to drug-affected babies.' 64 She shows us
subordination stemming from a variety of sources, the least of which is
intentional racial discrimination; because the primary problem is not conscious
discrimination, rooting out the deliberately discriminating official cannot
provide an adequate solution. We see the need for a remedy because Roberts's
portrayal allows us to see these women as victims as well as perpetrators. And
we also see that these forms of subordination are likely to affect "respectable"
black women too, though not in such harsh ways.
The same truth is present in the stories of the people at the very
bottom-death-sentenced inmates. The shocking discovery I have made in
representing black death row inmates is that the phenomena of race
consciousness and racial subordination, while they find many different
expressions, are always present. I will tell only two men's stories here (and
only a part of their stories at that), and then I will explain what I think those
stories tell us about race neutrality.
outcome, black defendants must be treated with the same respect that is accorded white defendants.




Tommie Smith was black. It was undisputed that plainclothes Indianapolis
police officers burst into Tommie Smith's home before dawn and that Tommie
Smith shot and killed one of them. The police officers shot Smith, wounding
him so severely that he was unconscious by the time they reached him. All
other facts, including the order of the shootings and whether the police
announced their identity prior to their forcible entry, were disputed. After
Smith's trial, forensic experts discovered that the police account of the victim's
shooting was physically impossible. The victim, the prosecutor, the judge, and
the entire jury were white.
The prosecutor in Tommie Smith's trial made a string of racial comments,
some more brazen than others, but all of which threatened the unbiased
adjudication of Smith's guilt and determination of his sentence. Most egregious
was the prosecutor's deliberate invocation of an inflammatory racial stereotype.
In discussing the disputed claim that Smith shot the victim twice after he was
down, the prosecutor said:
Now, what about Tommie. Tommie signed his name for us and we
owe him a debt of gratitude. Because Tommie couldn't be satisfied
with tearing Jack's guts apart [with] that first shot. Oh, no. He's got
to play super-fly and come out here and blow holes in a man who is
lying dying on the sidewalk.1
65
"Superfly" is the title character in a 1972 film.'6 The film, which uses racial
epithets dozens of times, portrays a black cocaine dealer who succeeds in
ensuring his final 30-kilo deal by taking out a hit contract on the corrupt white
police commissioner's "faggot son and fat-legged daughter."'1
67
The prosecutor made a second blatantly racial remark when he
characterized the testimony of a black witness hostile to the prosecution as
"shucking and jiving."'' 68 In addition to the "Superfly" and "shucking and
jiving" comments, the prosecutor reminded the jury of the victim's majority
race by referring to him as "that Dutch hardhead."'169 He described the black
adult male defendants as "boys" in the same sentence in which he referred to
their white victims as "men."' 70 He gratuitously stereotyped and degraded
165. Smith v. Farley, 873 F. Supp. 1199, 1213 (N.D. Ind. 1994). aff'd. 59 F.3d 659 (7th Car. 1995).
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1123 (1996).
166. See SUPERFLY (Warner Bros. 1972).
167. Id., quoted in Smith, 59 F.3d at 664.
168. Smith, 59 F.3d at 664.
169. Smith v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1055. 1064 (Ind. 1987). cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988); Record
on Appeal at 2260-61, Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-3818). The complete Record
on Appeal is on file with Professor Thomas Schomhorst.
170. Record on Appeal at 2261.
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them by calling them "privates" and "stupid."'' 7 With only slightly more
subtlety, he set them apart as "these people" and "this one and that."'
7 1
The Indiana state court's opinion is an amazing example of escalating
denial and unproven assertion. The court began by dismissing the references
to Smith as a "private[]," to his "stupidity," and to him as a "boy" as "general
slang [and] not ... racial comment[s]."' 73 About "shucking and jiving" on
the stand, the court complacently observed, "The term is clearly of black
origin, used to mean to talk in a patently misleading or evasive manner. Its use
reminds the jury of the untrustworthy appearance of this witness.' 74 Finally,
it concluded without analysis that
[d]espite the racial content of the term 'Superfly,' it is not out of
bounds to make such an allusion by saying Smith acted like
'Superfly,' either to characterize his actions by comparison with a
known fictional figure, or to imply that [his] behavior is to some
extent modeled on the fictional example. 75
The Seventh Circuit, on habeas corpus, issued an opinion that conducts a
lengthier discussion, but ultimately dismisses Smith's claims as well. 176
Smith's due process claim fails, according to the opinion, because he did not
show that the prosecutor's repeated use of racially charged and derogatory
imagery had any impact on the jury's consideration of the case. 77 In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Posner first questioned whether the "shucking
and jiving" remark is racial in character, despite its application to a black
witness. He acknowledged the disparaging nature of the term and its origins
in "Negro dialect," but wondered whether "shucking and jiving" is not a
"crossover" term like schnorrer and chutzpah, which "have become absorbed
into standard English and are now applied to members of all racial and ethnic
groups."'7 Apparently he believed that this possibility disposed of the
claimed impropriety of the remark, for the opinion says nothing more about it.
Judge Posner did acknowledge the racial character of the reference to
"Superfly," but only to chastise Smith's lawyers for making "no effort to
establish the likely meaning of the term to the members of the jury or to
persons demographically similar to them."' 179 Because the movie was
"intended for and marketed to black audiences," Judge Posner claimed that it






176. See Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1995).
177. See id. at 664-65.
178. Id. at 664.
179. Id.
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"merely conjecture" the contention that the use of the term "Superfly" had any
impact on the jury's consideration of the case.'8
Posner's analysis is surprising for a number of reasons. The analyses of
both the Indiana Supreme Court and the federal district court assumed that the
jury did understand the meaning of the allusion. Moreover, the prosecutor who
made the remark was white and knew that the jury was white; one wouldn't
expect him to refer to "Superfly" if he thought the jury would be baffled by
it. Finally, it is hard to imagine how Smith's appointed lawyers would have
conducted (and, for that matter, financed) a study of what the term "Superfly"
means to white audiences; such a study would not necessarily have shown
what it meant to Smith's jury anyway. Perhaps to reassure the reader, the
Seventh Circuit's opinion notes that "one or two isolated references to race or
ethnicity, wholly unlikely to sway a jury, do not compel a new trial" when
overwhelming evidence of guilt is established. 8' But this reassurance too is
predicated on a false premise, for the opinion completely ignores the other
racial remarks that would have taken this case out of the "isolated references"
category, if such a category exists. 8 2 Perhaps some of these remarks, taken
in isolation, might appear random and harmless, but looking at the repetition
of racially charged words and phrases makes clear that the prosecutor "so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process."' 8 3 Racial prejudice may be engendered by racial arguments
that show a modest degree of sophistication; certainly the law must recognize
that an argument based on racial stereotypes creates bias regardless of whether
or not those stereotypes are expressed with animosity.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc's
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari without dissent.'" The clemency
board spent less than an hour in deciding to recommend against clemency, and
the State of Indiana executed Tommie Smith shortly thereafter.' 
6
Tommie Smith's sad story provokes a number of observations, all of which
have general implications for understanding the nature of racial bias and the
remedy it requires. I will mention three here. First, Smith's prosecutor would
not have said the things he did in referring to a black colleague. It was Smith's
outcast status as a capital defendant that permitted the prosecutor to use
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See TEUN A. VAN DUK, COMMUNICATING RAcISM: ETHNiC PREJUDICE IN TIIOUGHT AND TALK
104 (1987) (noting that prejudiced talk often uses pronouns of distance like "they." "them." or "those
people" to emphasize separation while protecting the speaker from the risk of social disapproval that
accompanies overt racial pronouncements).
183. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168. 181 (1986) (reiterating and applying the standard for due
process reversals based on prosecutorial misconduct).
184. See Smith v. Farley, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20627.
185. See In re Smith, 117 S. Ct. 1 (1996).
186. See John R. O'Neill, Behind Closed Doors. INDIANAPOUS STAR. July 21. 1996. at C3 (describing
Smith's death by lethal injection).
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inflammatory stereotypes so openly. But if he could think to say those things to
a jury-and believe that ajury would respond favorably to those kinds of racial
argument-don't we have to wonder whether he would not think the same
things, or at least analogous things, about a black colleague? And if we allow
a prosecutor to say such things in order to help him secure the death penalty for
an African American, won't he learn something about whether it is acceptable
to think about black people differently from how he thinks about other people?
In short, Kennedy's politics of respectability is impractical; if we ignore or
rationalize racial prejudice expressed toward capital defendants, we cannot
expect to cabin its incursion into the lives of the respectable.
Second, I think Tommie Smith's prosecutor could and did say what he did
because his audience was all white. It may be that one or more white jurors
were in fact offended by his remarks, but the prosecutor apparently assumed
that none of them would be. I doubt he would have made that assumption
about an African-American juror. Thus, even with regard to conscious,
egregious appeals to race, we need to look beyond race neutrality and attend
to the race of the decisionmakers in seeking a cure. Indeed, the race of the
decisionmakers is even more important when there are no explicit allusions to
race but racial stereotypes have nevertheless been triggered.
Third and finally, the administration of "race neutrality" by the Seventh
Circuit in this case can only be described as sophistry. It is ludicrous to
assume we have come so far from segregation and subordination that no one
would know black slang from white slang, or attach any racial connotations to
it if they did. (Do we really believe that the prosecutor regularly used the
words "shucking and jiving" when he was not speaking about African
Americans?) Moreover, Judge Posner's swashbuckling approah to doctrine is
appalling. While Judge Posner was blind in one eye to the color connotations
of "shucking and jiving," his better eye had to recognize the potential racial
shading of the "Superfly" comment; yet, in a leap of logic reminiscent of
Palmer v. Thompson,187 he found no constitutional violation in the
"Superfly" remark because the racial animosity may have been ineffective.
When this is the way in which the race neutrality line is policed against white
people, it is hard to see why black people-or anyone committed to racial
justice-should owe it any allegiance. Even if one were initially attracted to
an absolutist race neutrality, its disingenuous administration is disenchanting.
B. Ronnie Howard
During Ronnie Howard's trial, the state prosecutor used eight of his twelve
peremptory challenges to eliminate all but one black panel member. Of the
187. 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding as constitutional the closing of city swimming pools to avoid
integrating them, because the action did not affect black people differently from white people).
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first forty-two qualified jurors, thirty-five of whom were white and seven of
whom were black, the state struck six black jurors and four white jurors."'
When the alternates were selected from an additional eight jurors, the state
struck two more black jurors and no white jurors.' 9 The prosecutor's initial
response to Howard's Batson motion was to claim that Batson was not
applicable because one black juror remained on the panel.' 90 When the judge
nevertheless found the existence of a prima facie case, the prosecutor claimed
that race-neutral reasons, in particular the jurors' attitudes toward the death
penalty, supported all the challenges. In assessing whether there was any
validity to this claimed justification, I will go into some detail. This close
examination is particularly important because attitude toward the death penalty
is so frequently the proffered justification when black jurors are struck in
capital cases.
As a justification for striking Edward Wood and Charles Copeland (two
black jurors), the prosecutor cited only their views on the death penalty,' 9'
even though several white jurors he had accepted expressed their views in
remarkably similar terms. Wood had expressed some ambivalence about the
death penalty, stating that, while he could vote for it, he was "really not for the
death penalty"; he agreed with the prosecutor's characterization that he would
"lean toward life ... just about every time."' 92 When the prosecutor tried to
get him to go further and say that he "would have to be talked out of life into
death," he disagreed, stating, "I make my own decision." 93 The only reason
the prosecutor gave for striking Wood was this ambivalence, yet Wood's
sentiment was phrased in terms strikingly similar to those used by accepted
white juror Richard Ashmore. Ashmore said he would "prefer life
imprisonment with no chance of parole,""' and if the case were not "a very
extreme case," he would "lean toward life imprisonment. '"' " In fact,
Ashmore appeared to reserve the death penalty for a more limited class of
cases, describing an "extreme case" as one involving the rape and murder of
a little child or "a crime involving several people or a group of people held
hostage and murdered maliciously"'96-categories into which Ronnie
Howard's case clearly did not fall.
Black juror Charles Copeland found it "hard to move for death for
anybody" from a religious standpoint,' 97 but he denied that he would lean
188. See Record on Appeal at 840-41. Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-4017).
The complete Record on Appeal is on file with the author.
189. See id. at 1016-18.
190. See id.
191. See id at 843-44, 1020.
192. Id. at 566-68.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 718.
195. Id. at 719.
196. Id. at 716.
197. Id. at 681-82.
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toward life from the outset of a case.'98 He said, "I don't believe that another
man should take another man's life either legally or illegally,"' 99 but he also
said that as a former member of the armed services, he would be able to take
life in a military posture, and that in the case of an extreme murder he could
vote for the death penalty.20° Although he agreed with the prosecutor that
taking a life would "give [him] concern," he also said that "I would make my
final decision on whatever evidence was provided me." 201 Again, the
prosecutor's only claimed basis for striking Copeland was his attitude toward
the death penalty. Yet the prosecutor accepted white juror Sharon Lunny as
first alternate, despite Lunny's similar-indeed, arguably greater-expressions
of reluctance. Lunny did not specifically cite religious teachings as the grounds
for her reluctance, but referred to precisely the same moral teaching as had
Copeland, stating that she had "always been taught.., that you don't take a
life .... Because life cannot be replaced. ' 2 2 She went beyond Copeland's
statement that it would be "hard" to vote for the death penalty, stating first that
she "really didn't know" if she could, adding later, "I believe I could," if the
circumstances involved in the murder were "so aggravated, so heinous."20 3
After further questioning, she reiterated that she found the death penalty
appropriate in heinous murders, but gave only two examples of this category,
"dismemberment" and something "brutal and premeditated, ' '2°4 thus
suggesting that the set of cases in which she might consider the death penalty
was narrower than the set of cases ("extreme murders") in which Copeland
might do so.
While it is often difficult to compare viewpoints expressed in different
ways, this is a case in which accepted white jurors and struck black jurors
stated their views on the death penalty in almost identical language. It is hard
to imagine how Wood's "lean towards life" could be considered materially
different from Ashmore's "lean toward life imprisonment." Similarly, it is
impossible to distinguish meaningfully between Copeland's and Lunny's
statements of reluctance, both of which cited the moral principle that it is
wrong to take a life. To claim a distinction between such similarly expressed
views when the only apparent difference between the speakers is their race is
racial discrimination.
Variations of this type of discrimination occurred throughout the jury
selection process. I will mention just three more examples. First, with respect
to struck black juror Amanda Fuller, the prosecutor cited a combination of her
198. See id. at 68 1.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 680, 682.
201. Id. at 682.
202. Id. at 813.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 815-16.
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death penalty views, unstable work history, and age; similarly, with respect to
black alternate Antonio Golden, he cited the combination of her death penalty
views, erratic work history, and unemployed husband. These stated reasons are
impeached by the prosecutor's acceptance of white jurors whose relevant
attributes were extraordinarily similar.2 5 Second, the prosecutor's approach
in questioning black juror Gladys McElrath about her death penalty views was
much more likely to elicit an anti-death-penalty response than his very
different approach in questioning white jurors.206 Third, the prosecutor
205. The prosecutor claimed to have struck black juror Fuller for a combination of three reasons: her
allegedly unstable work history, her young age, and her statement that she was "indifferent" to the death
penalty. Id. at 843.
The first reason is simply inaccurate: Fuller had been employed at Burger King for a year prior to
trial, and before that she had worked for the same restaurant for six years. a job she left in order to attend
night school. See id. at 451-52. This is hardly an unstable work history. When challenged by the defense
attorney regarding his characterization, the prosecutor then claimed to rely on a purported discrepancy
between her questionnaire, which stated that she had worked at Burger King for nine months, and her
testimony that she had worked there one month. See id. at 84748. This alleged discrepancy between her
verbal testimony and her questionnaire simply did not exist: Fuller had stated in her testimony that she had
been employed at Burger King for "about a year now." Id. at 451. This answer meshes perfectly with her
questionnaire, which would have been filled out several months earlier.
The second stated reason, Fuller's age, adds nothing when considered by itself, given that the
prosecutor accepted three white jurors who were the same age or younger. See id. at 1782-85. The question
remains whether age, in combination with the third reason, could have justified the strike. But this third
reason, her purported "indifference" to the death penalty, was directly traceable to the prosecutor's
prompting. Fuller had said that her position on the death penalty "'depends on what the situation is." Id.
at 450. The prosecutor pursued this answer, asking whether she thought it was "good, bad or indifferent."
kd She had already said she wasn't "for" the death penalty in all cases. Nor was she "against" it in every
case. That left "indifferent," which she chose. Id. Yet, when white juror Carroll Jones said that his view
on the death penalty "depends on the circumstances." id. at 501, the prosecutor did not ask the follow up
"good, bad or indifferent" question, but simply deemed him acceptable.
Even more to the point is the prosecutor's treatment of accepted white juror Emily Bagwell, who, like
Fuller, was 22 years old. Bagwell's answers to the court's questioning made it clear that her views on the
death penalty were-like Fuller's-dependent on the particular situation. See id. at 59. Yet the prosecutor's
only question about Bagwell's death penalty views was whether she would be able to sign a verdict form
if she felt death was the appropriate punishment. See id. at 62-63. The prosecutor asked Bagwell no follow-
up question about whether she thought the death penalty was "good, bad or indifferent." despite the
equivalence of her initial response to Fuller's. Instead, he deemed her acceptable-and she, unlike Fuller
(whose "erratic work history" was cited by the prosecutor), was unemployed. See id. at 1782.
The treatment of black juror Antonio Golden was similarly disingenuous- I have the details on file
for the interested reader.
206. McElrath had initially stated that she "didn't believe in capital punishment." but "might could"
vote for it if the circumstances were "so bad," id. at 792, an expression of views similar to those of
accepted white juror Lunny, who stated first that she "really didn't know" if she could vote for death,
adding later "I believe I could," if the circumstances involving the murder were "so aggravated, so
heinous," id. at 813. McElrath's initial hesitation also sounds similar to, if not less substantial than. the
qualms expressed by accepted white juror Floyd Rohm, who twice stated that he was "really not certain"
whether he could ever vote for the death penalty, id. at 157. saying later only "I believe I could." id. at
161.
Reasonable prosecutors could adopt a variety of approaches to such ambivalence. One approach might
be to seek further negative statements from ambivalent jurors to support a challenge for cause: another
approach would be to try to lead ambivalent jurors to a more favorable view of the death penalty. Either
approach, if applied evenhandedly, would be permissible. What is not permissible is to adopt different
approaches based on the race of the ambivalent juror. This is the approach the prosecutor took. He
responded to McElrath's hesitation with a series of 10 leading questions, all of a sort that would tend to
solicit anti-death-penalty views-e.g., "You just don't think you could vote to electrocute someone?" Id.
at 793-94 (emphasis added). Follow-up questions of Rohm, however, focused first on his understanding
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radically mischaracterized the death penalty views of struck black juror Jeffrey
Dunbar.07 Despite these and other compelling indications of improper racial
motivation, the trial judge ruled that such motivation had not been shown.
The Supreme Court has held that state court findings of fact are ordinarily
entitled to a presumption of correctness and that, given a trial court's proximity
to the case, deference must ordinarily be afforded its determination that a
peremptory strike was made for race-neutral reasons." 8 Here, however, there
was no support in the record for the prosecutor's stated reasons for striking
black jurors Wood, Copeland, Fuller, and Golden, and there was an
extraordinary accumulation of evidence of racially discriminatory motivation.
Nevertheless, on direct appeal, a majority of the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed Howard's conviction over the dissenting judge's protest that "[a]
prosecutor is required to show that he challenged similarly situated members
of the majority group on identical or comparable grounds as members of the
,,21lminority group.
This is not a story of a renegade state court. The federal district court
judge then denied Howard's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed. 2'0 Neither the panel nor the entire court sitting en
banc was interested in hearing oral argument on the Batson issue. In the en
banc court's written opinion, the majority stated that, as a general matter, the
similarity of black and white jurors' expression of their views was not
determinative, because other factors, like "tone, demeanor, [and] facial
expression" may have been different.21' The prosecutor in Howard's case,
however, had not made any claims about tone, demeanor, or facial expression.
The court also stated that in this case the black jurors' "anti-death penalty
of the process and then (in non-leading form) on his feelings about the death penalty. See id. at 158-60.
The prosecutor's response to Rohm's expression of "mixed feelings" was to ask in a neutral manner,
"Could you give meaningful consideration to recommending death in this case?" Id. at 161 (emphasis
added). Follow-up questioning of ambivalent white juror Lunny was similarly open-ended and devoid of
explicit references to "electrocution." Id. at 814-16.
207. In striking Dunbar, the prosecutor cited his age, the fact that he had recently graduated from high
school, and the fact that "he said on two occasions that he could not vote for the death penalty." Id. at 842.
Dunbar's age did not distinguish him from a number of accepted white jurors, but no white jurors had just
graduated from high school. The description of his death penalty views, however, was misleading and
almost certainly specious.
Dunbar had in fact misunderstood the judge's question when he twice said "No" to the question of
whether he could vote for the death penalty. Id. at 135. Upon rephrasing of the question, however, he
immediately corrected himself, saying, "Oh, okay. I understand the question now. Yes, I could." Id. He
twice more repeated that he could vote for the death penalty. See id. at 135-36. Moreover, it is not possible
the prosecutor missed this correction, for one of these affirmations occurred in response to the prosecutor's
own question, "You misunderstood when he asked if you could vote for the death penalty?" Id. at 136. The
prosecutor clearly mischaracterized Dunbar's views (which included a statement that he was "generally for"
the death penalty, id. at 140), apparently to support a challenge he feared would look weak.
208. See Herandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991).
209. State v. Howard, 369 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 1988) (Finney, J., dissenting).
210. See Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (affirming the district court's
denial of habeas corpus).
211. Id. at 408.
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sentiments were much stronger. 212 It did not, however, quote any language
to support this assertion, and indeed there is no such language. With respect
to Golden and Fuller, the court merely repeated the prosecutor's
explanations 2t 3 and did not address the facts described in the footnotes
above2 4 and recounted in Howard's brief. The court did not address the
cumulative evidence of racial motivation either.
What truth emerges from this case? The first truth is that the prosecutor
desperately wanted to eliminate African Americans from the jury and believed
that a token, isolated African American would insulate his racially
discriminatory actions from review. Why did he desperately want to limit
African Americans from the jury? For the same reason so many other
prosecutors wish to do so: Especially in a capital sentencing proceeding against
an African American accused of an interracial crime, the race of the jurors is
likely to make a difference. We are back to the one racial statistic Kennedy
does accept: race-of-victim impact. But surely it is obvious why disparities
based on the race of the victim are likely to disappear in the face of racially
integrated juries.215
The second truth is that the shield of race neutrality is flimsy, if not
chimerical. There is no close review of proffered justifications because the
appellate court defers to trial court findings. But the trial judge does not have
to find racial motive even in the face of implausible justifications,2 ' 6 and if
need be, appellate courts can hypothesize additional factors upon which the
prosecutor might have relied. Surely this nominal enforcement of Batson is no
substitute for an integrated jury. Why would a trial judge so disregard his
duty? Perhaps part of the answer is that the purposeful discrimination standard
forces a judge to choose between ignoring specious justifications (like those
offered by Howard's prosecutor) or calling a fellow member of the bar a liar
and a racist. Under prevailing doctrine, there is simply no middle ground. The
only one who would benefit from the judge's choosing the harder of the two
options is a criminal defendant accused of a capital crime.
Would Kennedy have wanted to see Howard's conviction reversed? I do
not know; he so often avoids speaking of reversals because he does not want
to speak of situations involving less respectable African Americans. But one
last truth: Ronnie Howard may not be "respectable" in the eyes of many white
Americans, but those eyes have always missed much of what matters. He does
not have a college degree, a professional title, or even a clean record. But he
is capable of shame, selflessness, courage, warmth, humanity, and decency, and
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See supra notes 205-207.
215. Preliminary results from Professor Baldus's study of capital sentences in Philadlphia show that
race-of-victim effect diminishes as the number of minonty race jurors increases. See supra note 42.
216. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995).
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I am blessed to know him. I have to believe that if Professor Kennedy knew
Ronnie Howard, he would not turn away; and I think that if his readers had
seen the cases I have seen, they would not believe that race neutrality is the
road to racial justice in the administration of the criminal law.
V. CONCLUSION
I said I would tell only two death row inmates' stories, but life happens
between drafts, and so I will tell one more. Beau Gilbert and J.D. Gleaton are
brothers who were convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and
murder of a Lexington County, South Carolina convenience store owner. The
circumstances of the alleged murder were relatively unaggravated, but Gilbert
and Gleaton are black, and their victim was white, and in Lexington County,
there is a strong statistical race-of-victim component to the prosecutor's
decision to seek the death penalty.217 At their joint capital trial, the trial
judge made a written finding that there was "systematic" removal of African
Americans from the jury through discriminatory exercise of the peremptory
challenge. Unfortunately for Gilbert and Gleaton, the Supreme Court decided
Batson after their convictions had become final and has since held that Batson
is not retroactive.2
18
These losing issues are not, however, the only appearance race made in the
case. The defendants' African-American trial attorney-who I assume would
meet Kennedy's respectability standard-was concerned for his own personal
safety in that county; he always parked his car for an expeditious exit to the
city and insisted that he had to leave the courthouse before dark.219 The
victim's wife, a white woman, stood outside the prison years later and said to
the press, "Just like Dr. Martin Luther King, I also have a dream. I have a
dream that one day I am going to see J.D. and Beau go out of here in a
hearse.'220 What does it mean that thinking about Gilbert and Gleaton
conjures up a famous civil rights leader? What does it mean that Judge
Russell, a conservative white senior Fourth Circuit judge, was picketed as a
"scalliwag" (the derogatory appellation for Southerners who cooperated with
Northern carpetbaggers) because of his opinion affirming the district court's
grant of writs of habeas corpus to Gilbert and Gleaton?
22
'
Can the purposeful discrimination standard ever sort out these interwoven
racial stories? Can race-neutral measures ever reach this kind of pervasive race
consciousness? Can Gilbert and Gleaton's racial disadvantage be neatly
217. Data on file with Professor Theodore Eisenberg, Cornell Law School.
218. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam).
219. See Record on Appeal at 41,886-87, Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-17).
220. Telephone Interview with John H. Blume, Attorney for J.D. Gilbert (Mar. 24, 1998).
221. See Gilbert v. Moore, 121 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 1997). I personally observed picketing on November
2, 1997, outside the federal courthouse in Richmond, Virginia.
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separated from that of their attorney? The answer is clear, and it is not the
answer Kennedy gives.
Compassion in the end is wisdom.7 Any man's death diminishes
me.m
3
222. Compassion leads me, at least, to renounce the politics of respectability; %,tsdom. I think.
precludes an undifferentiated adherence to colorblindness.
223. See JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGE'T OCCASIONS 98 (1923).
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